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ABStRACt: this paper discuses Bernard Williams’ argument according to which utili-
tarianism is a bad moral theory because, by requiring us to reject conscience and our 
moral emotions in favour of the “lesser of evils”, it violates our moral integrity, itself 
a deep moral ideal . i discuss the implications of this objection, as well as the answer 
offered by Peter Railton . He claims that utilitarianism should respect (and not violate 
or reject) our conscience and moral emotions because, by violating our integrity for 
the best consequences, we would become demotivated and unable to act in the long 
run, and would thus decrease overall utility . this paper questions whether Railton’s 
solution adequately answers Williams’ objection, and argues that a possible answer 
should be looked for in recent studies in evolutionary psychology and in the very 
origin of our moral emotions .
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Hush: How many lives do you think you’ve cost, how 
many families you have ruined, by allowing the Joker to 
live? … And why? Because of your duty? your sense of 
justice?
Bruce: i’m no executioner . that’s why [our compassion] is 
so important, it separates us from them . if i kill him i will 
be crossing the line from which i would never return .
Grayson and Beatty (2006)
Bruce Wayne, a fictional character known also as Batman, has had over the 
years many chances to kill his nemesis Joker . Bruce could have anticipated 
that police would not be able to keep Joker imprisoned and that he would 
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escape, thus killing many innocent people before he could be stopped again . 
Should Bruce have killed Joker when he had a chance to?
if we deliberate that Bruce should have killed Joker, thus saving the lives 
of many innocent people, we are following the argumentation typical of 
utilitarianism, an ethical theory holding that the course of action we should 
adopt is the one that maximizes the overall happiness (White 2010) . Since 
we can reasonably assume that world w1, in which Joker is dead and all his 
future victims are alive, contains greater overall happiness than world w2, in 
which Joker is alive and many people are not (because of his killing them), we 
can conclude that w1 is morally more desirable than w2 . thus it seems that 
our duty is to do our best in order to bring w1 into existence . Bruce Wayne, 
however, does not share this idea by arguing that, although he is aware that 
by not killing Joker he put at risk the lives of many innocent people, he will 
not kill him because that would “make Bruce one of them” – if Bruce ignores 
his basic intuitions and commitments, his moral integrity would be violated, 
and his very identity would come into question .
Bernard Williams was the first to emphasize this line of argumentation 
– utilitarianism is a bad moral theory because, by requiring from us to reject 
conscience and our personal ideals in favour of the “lesser of evils”, it violates 
our moral integrity, itself a deep moral ideal (Williams 2004) . Bruce does not 
want to kill Joker (though utilitarians think he should) because killing Joker 
would violate his moral integrity . in this paper i try to defend utilitarian posi-
tion by addressing Williams’ argument with recent empirical data introduced 
by evolutionary psychology .
in the first section, i will provide a brief overview of Williams’ critique 
of utilitarianism, emphasizing that this is not a consequentialist argumenta-
tion – Williams does not claim that we should reject utilitarianism because 
the loss of our moral integrity will lead to bad consequences . His approach 
is completely different and invites us to change our moral perspective – if 
we think of our moral non-utilitarian feelings and intuitions as indications 
of what is right or wrong, utilitarian argumentation will have no persuasive 
power over us . According to Williams, Bruce refuses to kill Joker not because 
he believes that killing Joker would have the consequence of violating his 
moral integrity, thus turning him into a monster or making him unable to 
help other people as he used to till now – but because his very moral integrity 
prevents him from killing Joker .
Following this interpretation of Williams’ thought, in the second sec-
tion i consider Railton’s (1984) defence of consequentialism and claim that 
it misses the central point of Williams’ criticism . Railton argues that conse-
quentialism is not self-defeating by introducing the idea of a sophisticated 
consequentialist who has a reason to cultivate dispositions (emotions, intui-
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tions, and commitments) even if they will sometimes lead him to actions that 
do not produce the best consequences, because this will preserve his moral 
integrity and lead to better overall consequences . According to Railton, we 
can say that Bruce is a utilitarian and still argue that he has utilitarian reasons 
to preserve and protect his moral integrity, and consequently not to kill Joker . 
However, it seems that, although Railton position is innovative and intrigu-
ing, it approaches the problem presented by Williams from the consequen-
tialist point of view, and in the end does not solve it adequately .
in the final section i argue that, in order to defend consequentialism 
from Williams’ critique, we have to bring into question our emotions, in-
tuitions and commitments, i .e . the very elements that constitute our moral 
integrity . once we deny that our emotions and intuitions play an important 
role in moral epistemology we can no longer think of them “as indications 
of what is right or wrong”, and consequently we can no longer use Wil-
liams’ argumentation and say that there is no reason why we should follow 
utilitarian deliberation rather than our moral intuitions . this must be done 
in an impartial way, not by questioning their effectiveness to produce best 
consequences (for then we are presupposing consequentialist standards as 
objective), but instead by questioning the very origin of our emotions and 
intuitions . if we can, by relying on numerous studies in neuroscience and 
evolutionary psychology, explain our emotions and intuitions as products 
of our evolution, we can bring into question their moral force – we can thus 
reply to Williams without directly imposing a consequentialist perspective . 
once we can show that our feelings, at least on certain occasions, are not (or 
should not be) indications of what is right or wrong, we can start arguing 
that the initial problem (whether Bruce should kill Joker, thus violating his 
moral integrity) should be viewed from the consequentialist point of view . 
of course, one can always claim that, although our emotions and intuitions 
may be the product of our evolutionary past, they still play important role in 
our lives and to disregard them completely would lead to a great loss of util-
ity (or to bad consequences) – this can be a legitimate objection . only now, 
but and not before we have brought into question the moral power of our 
emotions and intuitions, we can use Railton’s argumentation to show that we 
should hold to some of our emotions and intuitions in order to produce the 
best consequences .
1. Williams’ critique of utilitarianism
Why do utilitarians believe that Bruce should have killed Joker? As we’ve seen 
earlier, consequentialism attaches value ultimately to states of affairs, and its 
concern is with state of affairs the world contains or will contain . if we want 
to know whether the action is morally good or bad, we have to focus on what 
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comes about if the action is done, and what comes about if it is not . We are 
thus as responsible for things we allowed or failed to prevent, as we are for 
the things we’ve done ourselves . this negative responsibility, Williams sug-
gests, might be viewed as a special application of the so called “principle of 
impartiality”, for it abstracts from the identity of the agent . Principle of im-
partiality holds that there can be no relevant difference from the moral point 
of view which consists just in the fact that it benefits or harms accrue to one 
person rather the another – “it’s me” can never be a morally comprehensible 
reason . Negative responsibility abstracts from the identity of the agent and 
thus represents the extreme of impartiality . By allowing Joker to live, Bruce 
is as responsible for the death of thousands innocents killed by Joker as he 
would be if he himself had killed them . Utilitarianism thus rejects the idea 
that each of us is responsible only for what he or she does, rather than also 
for what other people do . there are at least some circumstances in which we 
are instead also responsible for what other people do, as seems to be shown 
by Bruce’s case .
Few utilitarians who argue that Bruce did the right thing by allowing 
Joker to live might defend their position by including in the utility calculus 
other more remote (or less evident) effects, like possible effects on the agent’s 
character or on the public at large . if Bruce decides to kill Joker the psycho-
logical effects on him might be bad enough to cancel out the initial utilitarian 
advantages of that case . However, this seems very unlikely; if one is a rational 
utilitarian agent, he would not have bad psychological effects (because he 
feels that he has done a morally wrong thing) as long as he had initially ef-
fected a correct calculus . if one is not a thoroughly rational agent, he might 
have bad feelings, but as those feelings are irrational, they should not have 
great weight in a utilitarian calculation . in any case, these are only one man’s 
feelings, and their weight must be small when compared with the utility of 
thousands . Peter Railton, however, endorses this line of argumentation and 
tries to demonstrate that possible effects on the agent’s character might have 
sufficient influence and change the result of the utilitarian calculus . i’ll dis-
cuss this approach in the next section . However, it is important to emphasize 
that the critique presented in this paragraph is not William’s main point – he 
does not base his argument on the idea that it is impossible to preserve moral 
integrity within the utilitarian framework (though he thinks so); rather, he 
relies on the idea that utilitarianism, as a purely theoretical moral doctrine, is 
incompatible with our moral feelings and intuitions .
there is a common utilitarian appeal to the fact that Bruce’s refusal to 
kill Joker would be a kind of “self-indulgent squeamishness” – from the prin-
ciple of impartiality follows the idea of negative responsibility, and the claim 
that Bruce should kill Joker . His duty is to act in a way that brings about the 
best possible consequences, and any excuse that acting in such way violates 
197i . CERovAC: Utilitarianism and Moral integrity
his moral integrity is just like saying “it’s me” once again . if he fails to do so 
because of his emotions and intuitions, it seems that he is a morally weak 
person . Williams (2004: 254–255, italics added) disagrees:
the most [that the self-indulgent squeamishness appeal] can do, so far as i can 
see, is to invite one to consider how seriously, and for what reasons, one feels that 
what one is invited to do is (in these circumstances) wrong, and in particular, 
to consider a question from the utilitarian point of view . When the agent is not 
seeing the situation from the utilitarian point of view, the appeal cannot force 
him to do so […]
if he does not see it from the utilitarian point of view, he will not see his resist-
ance to the invitation, and the unpleasant feeling he associates with accepting it, 
just as disagreeable experiences of his; they figure rather as emotional expressions of 
a thought that to accept would be wrong .
[the self-indulgent squeamishness appeal] essentially tells him to regard his 
feelings just as unpleasant experiences of his, and he cannot answer the question 
they pose when they are precisely not so regarded, but are regarded as indications 
of what he thinks is right or wrong .
the main problem is how to convince those who do not share utilitarian 
point of view to disregard their moral feelings and embrace the utility cal-
culus . As long as people don’t disregard their moral feelings, they cannot 
embrace the utility calculus, for if they do, they will lose their moral identity 
– morality (in particular, utilitarian morality) will impose itself as something 
alien and their moral integrity will be threatened . Williams (2004: 255, italics 
added) writes:
We are partially at least not utilitarians, and cannot regard our moral feelings 
merely as objects of utilitarian value . Because our moral relation to the world is 
partly given by those feelings, to come to regard those feelings from a purely utili-
tarian point of view, as happening outside one’s moral itself, is to lose a sense of 
one’s moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one’s integrity .
to regard our moral feelings merely as objects in utility calculus is to 
alienate ourselves from our actions and the source of our actions in our own 
convictions . the main problem presented by Williams, it seems to me, in 
not of practical nature as Railton believes (how to do the utility calculus 
correctly), but of epistemic nature (what is the basis of our moral knowledge: 
should we do the utility calculus or follow our moral feelings and intuitions) . 
it seems that Williams (2004) considers our moral intuitions as premises in 
our moral deliberation: they are not merely feelings we have regarding certain 
actions and states, but indicators that something is morally right or wrong . if 
we consider our moral intuitions simply as more or less pleasurable feelings 
regarding certain actions, and if we consider our moral integrity as a kind of 
balance and coherence between our moral intuitions and our moral actions, 
it seems that Railton is successful in proving that utilitarianism is compati-
198 Prolegomena 14 (2) 2015
ble with moral integrity . Williams clearly disagrees, arguing that we cannot 
regard our feelings merely as objects of utilitarian value . they (at least par-
tly) constitute our moral relation to the world, thus having epistemic value 
(they are indicators whether an action is right or wrong) . this interpretation 
corresponds well with Williams’s (1985: 162) “relativism of distance”, the 
idea that, though we can have a moral discussion on a real confrontation 
(where a divergent outlook is a real option for us), there can always be ratio-
nally irresolvable disagreements, as well as his strong critique of most forms 
of moral objectivism (and moral universalism), the idea that some system of 
ethics applies universally . our moral feelings, Williams argues, are not simply 
unpleasant experiences, but (at least partly) sources of our moral knowledge, 
and any moral theory that does not treat them as such (and i believe Railton’s 
sophisticated consequentialism doesn’t) violates our moral integrity .
2. Railton’s defense of consequentialism
living up to the demands of morality, Railton (1984, 2003) argues, may 
bring with it alienation1 – from one’s personal commitments, from one’s 
feelings, from other people, and even from morality itself . He believes that 
problems about alienation show consequentialist theories to be self-defeating 
(Railton 1984) . Not only that alienation will decrease a level of utility we can 
have from certain relationships or commitments, thus reducing the overall 
utility in the world, but it might also make us unable to actively promote the 
good . Had Bruce killed Joker despite his moral conviction that to kill a per-
son is wrong, the impact on his moral integrity might make him unable (or 
demotivated) to perform many other actions that would help other people 
(Railton 1984: 135–136 has a similar example with Juan and linda2) . He 
1 Railton (1984: 135) defines alienation as a kind of estrangement, distancing or sepa-
rateness resulting in some sort of loss . this need not be a loss of something of value, and need 
not be a bad thing after all . Whether certain instance of alienation is a good or bad thing de-
pends upon what is lost . thus alienation from some people or cultures can be a good thing . 
2 in Railton’s (1984: 150–152) example, Juan and linda have a commuting marriage 
and normally get together every other week . one week she seems a bit depressed, so he de-
cides to take an extra trip in order to be with her . if he did not travel, he would save a large 
sum that could be donated to an international organization that would use it to dig a well in 
a drought-stricken village . this donation would produce better overall consequences, even if 
we consider linda’s uninterrupted malaise, Juan’s guilt and any ill effect on their relationship . 
if Juan had had a character that would have led him to perform the better act (act with better 
consequences, i .e . to donate the money and to dig a well), he would have had to have been 
less devoted to linda . it is quite probable that if he were less devoted to linda, his overall 
contribution to human well-being would be less in the end, perhaps because he would become 
more cynical and self-centered . Similarly, if Bruce had no problem with killing villains (i .e . to 
perform acts with better consequences), he would probably value life less and be less attentive 
to the others in need, thus producing worse consequences overall in the long turn . 
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believes that we must demonstrate how our moral integrity can be preserved 
within the consequentialist framework3 .
Railton begins by drawing an analogy between consequentialism and 
hedonism . He introduces the paradox of hedonism – if one adopts a hedon-
ist deliberation, one may well prevent himself from having or experiencing 
certain sorts of relationships and commitments that are among the greatest 
sources of happiness . this seems to be a pragmatic (not logical) paradox – the 
hedonist ought not to be a hedonist because the hedonist point of view might 
prevent him from attaining the fullest possible realization of sought-after val-
ues . We can thus distinguish two forms of hedonism: (i) subjective hedonism, 
according to which one should adopt the hedonist point of view in action, 
and always attempt to determine which act seems most likely to contribute to 
one’s happiness, and behave accordingly, and (ii) objective hedonism, which 
states that one should follow that course of action which would in fact most 
contribute to one’s happiness, even when this would involve not adopting the 
hedonist point of view in action . objective hedonist might thus observe the 
actual modes of thought and action of those people who seem most happy 
(he would find out that they are not subjective hedonists) . He may than try 
do develop in himself the traits of character that seem common in happy 
lives .
Railton believes that consequentialism faces the same paradox as he-
donism, and believes that the paradox can be solved in the similar way . He 
thus distinguishes two forms of consequentialism: according to (i) subjec-
tive consequentialism, one should always attempt to determine which act 
of those available would most promote the good, and should then try to 
act accordingly (one follows a consequentialist mode of decision-making), 
while according to (ii) objective consequentialism the criterion of the right-
ness of the act is whether it in fact would promote most good (one does the 
thing that would bring about the best outcomes) . Railton embraces objective 
consequentialism which sets a definitive and distinctive criterion of right ac-
tion, and it becomes an empirical question which modes of decision-making 
should be employed and when .4 Since some goods are attainable only if peo-
ple have well-developed characters, individuals may more often act rightly 
if they possess certain enduring motivational patterns, character traits and 
commitments . objective (or sophisticated) consequentialist thus has a reason 
3 Railton (1984: 149–150) clearly distinguishes consequentialism and utilitarianism, and 
rejects the latter by introducing pluralistic approach in which several goods are viewed as in-
trinsically valuable (happiness, knowledge, beauty, respect, solidarity, autonomy etc .) . though 
interesting and worthy of further analysis, this distinction will not be further discussed for i 
believe it has no significant influence on the critique i present at the end of this section .
4 Someone (like subjective consequentialists) who recommended a particular mode of 
decision-making regardless of consequences would be a self-contradicting consequentialist) . 
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to include in himself certain dispositions that will sometimes lead him to 
violate his own criterion of right action . He can believe that an act can stem 
from the dispositions it would be best to have, and yet be wrong (because it 
would produce worse consequences than other acts available) . one can thus 
approve of dispositions and commitments to rules that do not merely sup-
plement a commitment to act for the best, but sometimes override it, so that 
one knowingly does what is contrary to maximizing the good . one can be 
a utilitarian and still embrace his commitments and moral feelings, as well 
as act upon them even when they suggest actions that are contrary to maxi-
mizing the good . our moral integrity can thus be preserved, and Williams’ 
critique answered .
Does Railton’s defence of consequentialism show that consequentialist 
theories are not self-defeating? it probably does . Does it, however, success-
fully answer Williams’ criticism? i think it does not . Presumably, Railton is 
such a firm consequentialist that he tends to deal with an objection to a con-
sequentialist theory as if it would be invariantly directed to the consequences 
that the theory produces . However, as i emphasized earlier, Williams’ critique 
aims at discussing the very foundations of our moral knowledge, and not the 
consequences of alienation . on the contrary, Railton (like other utilitarians) 
regards our moral feelings, intuitions and commitments as mere objects in 
the consequentialist calculus, and (unlike other utilitarians) only gives them 
great significance in the calculus . He does not regard them as sources of our 
moral knowledge .
Although Railton (2003: 154, italics added) writes: “there is a cogni-
tive element in affection – it is not a mere feeling that is given for the delib-
erative self, but rather involves certain characteristic modes of thought and 
perception”, he does not regard it as a possible source of moral knowledge . 
A sophisticated consequentialist has pragmatic (and not epistemic) reasons 
to cultivate certain dispositions and commitments . He already knows what 
is good, and the only question is how to promote it . this is evident in many 
places in the paper (Railton 1984: 156, 144, italics added):
objective consequentialist sets a definitive and distinctive criterion of right action, 
and it becomes an empirical question which modes of decision-making should 
be employed .
[Sophisticated consequentialist] has a reason to include in himself certain dispo-
sitions that will sometimes lead him to violate his own criterion of right action .
According to Railton, we already know what is the right action (the action 
that produces the best consequences), and we use the appropriate disposi-
tions to sustain this action in order to bring it about . Williams, on the con-
trary, argues that these very dispositions can be viewed as one of the sources 
of our moral knowledge . i’ve emphasized earlier that the main problem is 
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how to convince those who do not share the utilitarian point of view to dis-
regard their moral feelings and embrace the utility calculus . Railton does not 
answer this question; he seems instead to presuppose that we already share 
the utilitarian point of view . By disregarding the epistemic role of our moral 
feelings and intuitions, he does not give the correct account of what our 
moral integrity is .
i suggest that in order to dispute Williams’ claim on his own grounds we 
have to show that our moral feelings and intuitions, at least on some occa-
sions, should not have the epistemic role Williams has given them . in order 
to defend utilitarianism (and consequentialism) from Williams’ critique we 
must show that some of our moral feelings and intuitions are in fact irrational 
and should, perhaps, be treated as important objects in utilitarian calculus, 
but not as sources of our moral knowledge .
3. The role of moral intuitions in ethics
in traditional moral debates moral intuitions have been considered as foun-
dations of a moral knowledge, and every conflict between the implications of 
a moral theory and our moral intuitions was considered as a good argument 
against that very theory . it seems that Williams embraces this standpoint 
when he argues that utilitarianism is a bad moral theory because it violates 
our moral integrity . However, this view can be brought into question .
Jonathan Haidt (2001: 814) asked people to respond to a carefully con-
structed incest story:
Julie and Mark are brother and sister, traveling together on summer vacation . 
one night, while they were staying alone in the cabin, they decided that it 
would be interesting and fun if they tried making love . Julie was already taking 
birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe . they both en-
joy making love but decide not to do it again . they keep that night as a special 
secret between them, which makes them feel even closer to each other . What do 
you think about that, was it oK for them to make love?
Most people are quick to say that what Julie and Mark did was wrong . they 
try to explain or justify their response by giving reasons like the dangers of 
inbreeding, psychological distress or the destabilizing effect on the society . 
However, all these objections are mistaken because the story was constructed 
to avoid them . Eventually, many people might say something like “i don’t 
know, i can’t explain it, i just know it’s wrong” (Haidt 2001) . the judg-
ments these people reach are based on their intuitive responses and not on the 
utilitarian reasons they offer . Similar conclusions can be drawn from the re-
searches made on “trolley problems”: while most people agree that one ought 
to throw a switch thus saving five people (that otherwise would have been 
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killed) and killing one person (that otherwise would have survived), when 
faced with similar situations that involve the use of physical violence they 
change their mind . Most people think that we should not throw a fat per-
son from a footbridge over the track, thus stopping the train and saving five 
people . there is no relevant numeric difference between these two cases (in 
both we sacrifice one person in order to save five), yet most people consider 
throwing a switch as a good action, and throwing a fat man on the track as a 
morally bad action (Singer 2005) . Why?
Recent studies (e .g . Cosmides and tooby 2008) in evolutionary psychol-
ogy give us answers to this question, as well as to the question about Julie and 
Mark incest story . the recognition that our cognitive and moral architecture, 
and consequently our moral concepts, moral intuitions and moral sentiments 
are the product of natural selection, and so represent reflections of our evo-
lutionary process, seems difficult to escape . We are naturally determined to 
have such intuitions because of our evolutionary past; a community that did 
not condemn incest (when contraception was not available) or physical vio-
lence among its members had lower chances to survive . Since communities 
that did not condemn and discourage these behaviours had to bear additional 
costs (children with development problems and higher rate of injured mem-
bers), they were less successful in reproduction through time and were not fa-
voured by selection . Eventually, over the generations, only communities who 
condemn incest and physical violence among their members survived, and 
condemnation of these behaviours became intuitive, spontaneous and “com-
mon sense” response for the members of these communities (Cosmides and 
tooby 2008) . Furthermore, it has been shown that the amplitude of costs 
and benefits associated with particular acts influences the strength of moral 
disapproval and approval, respectively (lieberman 2008) . Greater cost that 
certain behaviour imposes upon a community will result with stronger moral 
intuitions against that type of behaviour . Different answers to trolley prob-
lem can thus be explained by appeal to our evolutionary past: faced with mil-
lions of years of direct physical violence, we have developed a natural negative 
reaction towards it . Since it has been possible to harm someone by throwing a 
switch for just a century or two, we do not have an appropriate emotional re-
action to this option . A variation to famous experiment conducted by Stanley 
Milgram (2009) supports this idea: Milgram was researching our obedience 
to authority figures by asking participants (who did not know they were test 
subjects, but thought that they were laboratory assistants) to punish a fake 
test subject (actually an actor, one of his graduate students) when he made 
a mistake in a memory test . Apart from showing that people have a strong 
tendency to obey authority even when it is obvious that they are causing 
suffering in other persons, Milgram found that people are more willing to 
execute strong punishments and cause intense pain when they could do it 
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from a distance, by pressing a button and giving a (fake) test subject a (fake) 
electro shock . When they had to hold the (fake) test subject’s arm physically 
onto a (fake) shock plate, they were less willing to execute strong punish-
ments and cause intense pain . this clearly shows that we have an inborn 
negative emotional response towards directly and physically causing pain in 
others, but such emotional response is much weaker when the same amount 
of pain is caused from a distance . Consequently, it seems that these intuitions 
are not reliable nowadays, when we have various contraception methods (in 
the incest scenario) and can commit a harmful (violent) act without direct 
physical interference (like by throwing a switch in the trolley case) .
We can further support this claim by introducing fMRi imaging, a tech-
nology that scans the brain of a test subject and monitors which area is active 
when a decision is being made . in case of moral decision-making presented 
in the trolley problem, fMRi imaging has shown that considering more direct 
and personal options (like pushing a fat person from a footbridge) has been 
linked with strong activity in the area of the brain that is associated with the 
emotions, while considering indirect and impersonal options (like throwing a 
switch) has been linked with activity in other areas of the brain, in particular 
to those related to cognitive functions (Greene 2002) . Furthermore, Greene 
(2014) has been able to show that those who were ready to push a fat person 
from a footbridge took more time to make a decision than others – they had 
a negative emotional response to the idea of pushing someone from a foot-
bridge, but they decided (against their emotions) that pushing a fat person 
would be a right thing in those circumstances . this shows that, at least in 
some situations, our emotions or intuitions are not reliable indications of 
what is right or wrong, but can instead lead us to incoherent or contradictory 
moral beliefs (e .g . believing that two trolley cases with no relevant difference 
should be treated differently) .
if at least some (and maybe all) of our moral intuitions and commit-
ments have their origin in our evolutionary past, and are not suitable for 
the moral problems we are facing nowadays, it is difficult to claim that they 
should still be considered as a source of our moral knowledge . if evolutionary 
psychology can explain why we have a certain intuition or feeling (e .g . why 
most people think that incest is morally wrong), we can no longer talk about 
epistemic power of our intuitions and moral feelings . And if they no longer 
have epistemic power, they cannot be used as objections to moral theories 
they are in conflict with . if a moral theory (like utilitarianism) violates our 
moral integrity, we will no longer be able to say that this is an epistemic prob-
lem – we will have a reason to disregard (some of ) our moral intuitions and 
commitments . As i noted earlier, i believe that Williams presents his argu-
ment as the epistemic problem for utilitarianism, and it seems to me that the 
only way to adequately answer the Williams’ critique is to confront him on 
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the epistemic ground . By demonstrating that intuitions and emotions have 
no epistemic value we undermine his idea that one can refuse the utilitar-
ian perspective simply by introducing intuitions and feelings incompatible 
with it . i agree that there can be incompatibilities between a moral theory 
and some intuitions and emotions, but argue that these incompatibilities are 
morally irrelevant if we can show that corresponding intuitions and feelings 
have no epistemic value . Williams (2004: 260, italics added) himself stresses 
that in moral deliberation “we should not try to regard someone’s reactions, im-
pulses and deeply held projects in the face of pattern of utilities, but we should first 
need to try to understand them” . A good way of trying to understand our reac-
tions and impulses (i .e . our moral feelings and intuitions) is inquiring into 
their origin, and if that inquiry produces good reasons for questioning their 
epistemic value (e .g . if evolutionary psychology can show that we are predict-
ably irrational in regard to some moral cases, like the incest story or the trol-
ley problems), we should conclude that (some of ) our moral intuitions are 
not good objection to utilitarian arguments . this, of course, does not entail 
that our moral intuitions are, by default, epistemically flawed . However, it 
demonstrates that, in certain cases, we can make a good non-utilitarian argu-
ment against moral intuitions5 . Evolutionary psychology is still developing 
and more and more morally relevant cases will be analysed – thus evolution-
ary psychology represents a good non-utilitarian way of evaluating our moral 
intuitions .
one can claim that, although our emotions and intuitions may be the 
product of our evolutionary past and have no epistemic power, they still play 
important role in our lives and to disregard them completely would lead to a 
great loss of utility (or to bad consequences) . only after bringing into ques-
tion the epistemic and moral power of our emotions and intuitions), we can 
use Railton-like argumentations to show that we should hold to some of our 
emotions and intuitions .6
5 Since Williams (2004: 254) regards our moral intuitions as indicators that something 
is right or wrong, something important is lost if we can show that our moral intuitions are 
epistemically unreliable . Furthermore, if moral intuitions constitute an important part of 
our moral integrity (namely, moral integrity is preserved when our actions correspond to our 
moral intuitions), then the entire argument relaying on moral integrity is seriously weakened . 
Consider someone whose moral intuitions are clearly wrong (e .g . a Nazi officer) – it would 
seem very odd to argue for or against certain action by introducing the importance of the 
preservation of his or her moral integrity . the problem is reintroduced when it is not so clear 
that someone’s intuitions are right or wrong (e .g . trolley problem), and it is in this cases that 
evolutionary psychology can give us valuable answers . 
6 i thank Patrizia Pedrini and Elvio Baccarini for numerous discussions and consultations 
that have inspired and shaped this paper . 
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